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This paper derives a New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model with
liquidity constrained consumers and sticky prices. The model allows a role
for both government spending and taxation in the DGE model. The model
is then estimated using US data. We demonstrate that there seems to be
a signi￿cant role for rule-of-thumb consumer behaviour. Our model is then
used to analyse the interaction between ￿scal and monetary policies. We
examine the extent to which ￿scal policy (automatic stabilisers) assist or
hinder monetary policy when the latter takes a standard forward-looking
in￿ ation targeting form. We also examine the extent to which inertia in
￿scal policy and the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers a⁄ects output and
in￿ ation variability in the presence of such a monetary policy rule.
JEL Codes: E58, E62, E631 Introduction
There is a vast and growing literature on estimating New Keynesian dynamic
general equilibrium (NK-DGE) models for policy analysis. The focus of most
of this work has been on the robustness and optimality of monetary policy
rules. In contrast, relatively little attention has been given to the issue of
monetary-￿scal policy interactions. A number of papers have examined the
interdependence between ￿scal and monetary policies using DGE models1,
or game-theoretic models2, but none of these models have been tested em-
pirically3.
In this paper we estimate a small econometric model for the USA over
the sample period 1970-2001, based on a log-linearised New Keynesian DGE
model, and analyse the performance of ￿scal stabilizers in the presence of
forward-looking Taylor rule. The innovation in this paper is three-fold. First,
we extend existing DGE models to include a wider range of ￿scal policy
transmission channels. Second, our model is estimated, in contrast to some
attempts to calibrate or numerically simulate these models. Third, we show
how ￿scal and monetary policy interact in a structural model with inertia
due to the presence of non-optimising consumers and ￿rms. As a useful by-
product, the estimated model provides some insights to the extent to which
consumers on aggregate consume out of current income.
Conventional New Keynesian DGE models (as discussed for instance in
Gal￿, 2003) typically provide a very limited role for ￿scal policy. The stan-
dard forward-looking IS curve is based on the assumption of "Ricardian"
forward-looking consumers, who have full access to complete ￿nancial mar-
kets. This assumption is contradicted by the empirical evidence on the per-
manent income hypothesis which supports the view that a signi￿cant propor-
tion of consumers are non-Ricardian. Moreover, conventional DGE models
cannot rationalize the positive response of consumption to public expenditure
shocks. To account for these e⁄ects, we use the modelling approach proposed
1See for example Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2001), Be-
nigno and Woodford (2003) for an analysis of ￿scal and monetary interactions in theoret-
ical models. Perez and Hiebert (2002) and Zagaglia (2002) have experimented with DGE
model simulations which include some ￿scal closure rules.
2See Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001).
3In Muscatelli et al. (2003) we provide an early attempt to examine ￿scal rules in
an estimated DGE model, but the channels of transmission of ￿scal policy are extremely
limited as we use a model which displays Ricardian equivalence.
1by Gal￿ et al. (2002) who, following Campbell and Mankiw (1989), assume
that a fraction of households are constrained to consume out of current in-
come. We show that about 37% of consumers are non-optimising, which
accords with the evidence presented in Mankiw (2000). By introducing im-
perfect consumption smoothing, we are able to model the demand e⁄ect of
other ￿scal variables, i.e. taxes and transfers. On the supply side of the
economy, to our knowledge existing empirically estimated NK-DGE models
neglect ￿scal distortions. In this paper we make a ￿rst attempt at estimat-
ing the empirical e⁄ect of the tax wedge on the Phillips curve in NK-DGE
models.
We examine the dynamic properties of our model following unanticipated
structural and policy shocks, and conduct some policy analysis. We examine
whether the introduction of automatic ￿scal stabilizers markedly improves
the stabilization properties of the model in the presence of an inertial mon-
etary policy rule. Earlier contributions (Muscatelli et al., 2003) had found
that countercyclical ￿scal policy can be welfare-reducing in the presence of
optimizing monetary policy-makers. By introducing a role for taxation in the
NK-DGE model, we ￿nd that automatic stabilizers based on taxation tend
to reduce the variability of in￿ ation and output following supply-side shocks,
and tend to be more e¢ cient than those based on government spending. We
also analyze the impact of inertia (persistence) in the ￿scal rule and in the
structural model on the performance of the monetary and ￿scal policy rules,
and ￿nd that inertial taxation rules tend to be more e¢ cient than inertial
government expenditure rules. Finally we con￿rm the results in Gal￿ et al.
(2002) that the presence of rule of thumb consumers tends to create more
instability in the model (by increasing the variability of output and in￿ ation
following an in￿ ation shock), but also ￿nd that automatic stabilizers based
on taxation tend to o⁄set the impact of rule-of-thumb consumers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will
brie￿ y survey the existing literature. In Section 3, we outline the structure of
our estimated model and our empirical methodology. In Section 4, we report
our estimates and examine some dynamic simulations from our estimated
models, while in Section 5 we examine the performance and interaction of
the monetary and ￿scal policy rules. Section 6 concludes.
22 The Existing Literature
Much of the literature on ￿scal-monetary policy interactions has focused on
whether monetary and ￿scal policy operate as strategic complements or sub-
stitutes, i.e. whether they tend to support or o⁄set each other in stabilising
the economy. Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001) explore the interdependence
between the ￿scal authority and the central bank in a model where the latter
has only partial control over in￿ ation, which is also directly a⁄ected by the
￿scal policy stance. They show that in equilibrium the two policy rules are
complements when ￿scal expansions have non-Keynesian (contractionary) ef-
fects on output and in￿ ation. Buti, Roeger and in￿ t Veld (2001) suggest that
the speci￿c form of interdependence between ￿scal and monetary policies,
i.e. the alternative between strategic substitutability and complementarity,
should not necessarily be interpreted in terms of con￿ ict or cooperation, and
might be shock-dependent. In their model supply shocks unambiguously in-
duce con￿ icting policies, whereas the opposite holds true for demand shocks.
Empirical contributions in this area are mainly based on panel data tech-
niques and VAR analyses. Cross-sectional or panel data examine the re-
lationship between ￿scal and monetary policies over the cycle. Work by
MØlitz (1997, 2000) and Wyplosz (1999) broadly supports the view that the
two policies have acted in opposition over the last 2-3 decades. Von Hagen,
Hughes-Hallett and Strauch (2001) ￿nd that the interdependence between
the two policymakers is asymmetric: looser ￿scal stances match monetary
contractions, whereas monetary policies broadly accommodate ￿scal expan-
sions. Muscatelli et al. (2001) examine the interaction between ￿scal and
monetary policy instruments using conventional VAR and Bayesian VAR
models for several G7 economies, and show that the ￿scal shocks identi￿ed
in the VAR have a signi￿cant impact4. They ￿nd that the result of strategic
substitutability does not hold uniformly for all countries. Moreover, they
report strong evidence that the linkage between ￿scal and monetary policy
has shifted post-1980, when ￿scal and monetary policies became much more
complementary.
The main problem with this empirical literature literature is that it is
silent on the issue of whether ￿scal policy provides a useful stabilising in￿ u-
4The number of contributions applying VAR techniques is still limited. This may be
due to the critique in Mountford and Uhlig (2002) that true ￿scal policy surprises may be
di¢ cult to detect in a VAR model.
3ence, or whether it hinders the role of monetary policy. Without a structural
model it is di¢ cult to interpret the empirical correlations between the two
policy variables. In the work of MØlitz (1997, 2000) and Wyplosz (1999) one
cannot tell whether the correlation between the policy instruments over the
cycle derives from systematic policy responses or from responses to structural
or policy shocks. In the VARs estimated by Muscatelli et al. (2001) the fo-
cus is on the reaction of policy instruments to other policy shocks, but it is
notoriously di¢ cult to interpret implicit policy reaction functions in VARs
especially if the ￿ true￿underlying structural model is forward-looking.
More recently, Muscatelli et al. (2003) examine the interaction of mon-
etary and ￿scal policies using an estimated New Keynesian dynamic general
equilibrium model for the US. In contrast to earlier work they show that the
strategic complementarity or substitutability of ￿scal and monetary policy
depends crucially on the types of shocks hitting the economy, and on the
assumptions made about the underlying structural model. The greater com-
plementarity of ￿scal and monetary policy seen in the 1990s compared to the
1980s was due to the changing nature of the underlying shocks.
Our focus in this paper is di⁄erent. We estimate a NK-DGE model which,
in contrast to our earlier work and other attempts to estimate structural
New Keynesian models5, allows for a richer range of transmission channels
for ￿scal policy, whilst still maintaining a small model whose parameters are
estimated. This model is then used to conduct policy analysis to see how ￿s-
cal and monetary policy interact and what implications the degree of inertia
in the structural model and in the policy rules has for ￿scal policy design.
The introduction of central bank independence in most of the industrialised
economies has raised the issue of whether ￿scal and monetary policies are
properly co-ordinated. One motivation for this paper is to show that ￿s-
cal stabilizers, which can be shown to be counterproductive in some DGE
models (e.g. Muscatelli et al., 2003)6 can signi￿cantly improve welfare in an
economy characterized by the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers. In par-
ticular, taxation rules based on automatic stabilisers can be shown to have
5See Gali et al. (2001), Leith and Malley (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002).
6In Muscatelli et al. (2003) our ￿scal rules are estimated and we do not examine
alternative forms for these rules. In that paper we show that countercyclical ￿scal policy
can be welfare-reducing if ￿scal and monetary policy rules are inertial and not co-ordinated.
Our conjecture in that paper was that this surprising result was probably due to the
interaction of highly inertial estimated monetary and ￿scal policy rules. In this paper we
study ￿scal policy rules in a DSGE model which involves a richer range of ￿scal channels.
4a welfare-enhancing e⁄ect.
Our results are complementary to those obtained using di⁄erent frame-
works by other researchers. Gordon and Leeper (2003) ￿nd, using a calibrated
model for the US economy, that ￿scal stabilization policies tends to desta-
bilize the business cycle because of their impact on debt service obligations.
Jones (2002) uses an estimated stochastic growth model (without price stick-
iness) for the US to show that ￿scal policy had limited stabilization e⁄ects
in the post-war period.
3 A New-Keynesian Structural Model
We use a small forward-looking NK-DGE model, comprising a dynamic IS
model for output and a ￿ New Keynesian Phillips Curve￿speci￿cation for
in￿ ation.
3.1 Households
We consider two types of households. Households in the ￿rst group, i, bene￿t
from full access to the capital markets and are therefore free to optimize.
The proportion of optimising consumers in the economy is given as (1 ￿ #):

























t represents consumption of a basket of goods (to be de￿ned
below), Ht is an index of external habits, ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion, No
t is the level of employment, and "l is a shock to labour supply.











Optimizing consumers maximize (1) subject to their intertemporal budget
constraint, which is expressed in real terms as:
(1=rt)a
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5where consumers hold their ￿nancial wealth (at) in the form of one-period
state-contingent securities, which yield a return of rt. The optimizing con-
sumer￿ s disposable income consists of labour income (Wt=Pt)Noi
t , where Wt
is the nominal wage, Pt is a consumer price index (de￿ned below), plus the
dividends from the pro￿ts of the imperfectly competitive ￿rms Di
t, plus pub-
lic transfers GTRi
t minus personal taxes T i
t. Both transfers and taxes are
lump-sum by assumption.
As in Gal￿ et al. (2002) we assume that a proportion # of households
follow a rule of thumb, and consume their current disposable income7. This
admittedly ad hoc assumption may be justi￿ed assuming myopia or limited
participation to capital markets. We also assume that rule-of-thumb con-
sumers supply a constant amount of labour8, NRT. Thus the consumption
function of the representative rule-of-thumb consumer amounts to:
C
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Firms￿production technology is assumed to be a simple Cobb-Douglas func-
tion of labour and capital for each consumption good variety z. Capital is
assumed ￿xed and normalized to unity:
Yt(z) = A(Nt(z))
1￿￿ (5)
We introduce ￿scal distortions by assuming that taxes on labour take the
form of a uniform payroll tax9. Therefore ￿rms￿demand for labour is given
by:
7See also Campbell and Mankiw (1989), who introduce this type of heterogeneity
amongst consumers.Carroll (1997) introduces a richer model of ￿ bu⁄er-stock consump-
tion￿ .






, levied on rule-of-thumb consumers are always nil. This result
would never obtain in our model, where taxes and transfers are explicitly modeled. Thus,
for sake of simplicity we assume a constant labour supply. Since consumption cannot be





for any given level of
the real wage.









where Pt(z) is the price of good z, t￿
PR is the tax rate per unit of employed
labour, i.e. t￿
PR = T￿
N , and T ￿are the total revenues from the payroll tax.
Turning next to the model of ￿rms￿pricing behavior, we consider a stan-
dard model of monopolistic competition with sticky prices, as set out in
Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001), and Leith and Malley (2002)10. Total
consumption for all consumers (optimisers and rule-of-thumb) is given by a













































Sticky prices are incorporated into this model below, by assuming a Calvo
pricing mechanism, with some proportion of ￿rms adjusting their prices every
period, and the rest supplying output on demand, at a constant price.
3.3 The IS and the Phillips curve
By log-linearizing the model around steady state we are then able to de-
rive the forward-looking IS and the ￿ New Keynesian Phillips curve (see the
10See also Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), and Sbordone (2002).
7Appendix for a proof) 11:
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where b gt is government spending excluding government transfers d GTR.
￿ Hatted￿lower-case variables represent percentage deviations from the steady
state. ￿ Barred￿variables denote steady-state values.
At ￿rst sight eq. (10) looks very complex. In fact, by imposing no habit,
￿ = 0, and the absence of rule-of-thumb consumers, NRT
N = # = 0, eq. (10)
would collapse to a purely forward-looking IS curve. Note that habit for-
mation introduces a link between current and past output (as in Carroll,
2000, Leith and Malley, 2002; Smets and Wouters, 2002). Moreover, the
presence of non-optimizing consumers establishes a link between the demand
for goods, net personal taxes, d GTR ￿ T, and the real wage. Fiscal policy im-
pacts on output in three ways. First, through the usual resource withdrawal
e⁄ect of government consumption, b gt; second, through the impact of net
personal taxes d GTR ￿ T on the current disposable income of rule-of-thumb
consumers. Third, through the impact of payroll taxes T ￿on the real wage
of rule-of-thumb consumers12. Finally, rule-of-thumb consumers weaken the
impact of interest rate policy on aggregate demand. As shown in Gal￿ et al.
(2002) this may have important implications for the conduct of monetary
policy. This is confrimed by our estimates.
11We ignore investment and the external sector. Arguably, the open-economy considera-
tions are less important to the USA, which is the focus of our analysis here. The extension
of our modeling approach to the open economy is left to further work.
12From equations (4) and (6) it should be clear that, in each period, the equilibrium real
wage is inversely related to employment and the payroll tax. In the Appendix we explain
why the rate of change of these variables a⁄ects current output.
8Note that whilst government spending impacts on the consumption be-
haviour of optimising consumers via the resource-withdrawal e⁄ect, taxation
impacts through its e⁄ect on disposable income for rule-of-thumb consumers,
and hence via the external habit (total consumption) variable. This ensures
that government spending enters via a distributed lag in (10) which sum to
zero, while personal and payroll taxes enter in di⁄erences, with coe¢ cients
of di⁄erent size. As we shall see below, this drives some of the results of the
model.
Turning to the Phillips curve, we de￿ne (1￿￿) as the proportion of ￿rms
adjusting their prices every period. A share ￿ of these is assumed to index
prices to in￿ ation in the previous period13, whereas the rest, (1 ￿ ￿), set
their prices optimally to maximize expected discounted real pro￿ts14, with a
discount factor ￿.
The ￿rms￿optimization, together with the assumptions about Calvo pric-
ing and indexation lead to an expression for price-setting which can be log-
linearized to yield (see the Appendix for details):
b ￿t =
￿b ￿t￿1 + ￿￿Etb ￿t+1
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
[￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))][1 + (￿=(1 ￿ ￿))￿]
b st (11)
where b st is the percentage change from steady state of the labour cost















b t￿ ￿ b n
￿
+b nt￿b yt
Equations (10) and (11) constitute our structural model. It is impor-
tant to note that in estimating (11), we treat real wages and employment
as exogenous. Other recent contributions (Leith and Malley, 2002, Smets
13This was pioneered by Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). Similar backward-looking elements
can be introduced to the NKPC equation by introducing indexation of all non-re-optimised
prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001, and Woodford, 2002, chapter 3).
14A similar speci￿cation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be obtained by making
the indexation process part of the optimisation process (see Smets and Wouters, 2002).
15Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001) specify (10) in terms of average real marginal




9and Wouters, 2002) estimate wage equations, and adding a wage equation
would have enabled us to consider the possibility of sticky wage dynamics.
However, this would have also added to the complexity of the model. As dis-
cussed below, when simulating our model we make some allowance for wage
adjustment.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Scope of the Study
We now turn to the empirical results16. We estimate the two equations (10)
and (11), using US quarterly data, over the sample period 1970(1)-2001(2).
The data de￿nitions used are reported in the Data Appendix.
The data have been seasonally adjusted, and to capture the spirit of the
NK models as log-linearizations, the data are transformed so that the vari-
ables are expressed in deviations from the ￿ steady state￿ 17. Real variables are
de-trended18, whilst the series on in￿ ation and the nominal interest rate (the
federal funds rate) are demeaned. Note that as the in￿ ation rate and inter-
est rate always enter the model together, all the equations are ￿ balanced￿in
terms of the levels of integration of the dependent and explanatory variables.
The government spending data (G) is total government spending exclud-
ing transfers and interest payments, whilst we use employers￿social security
contributions as payroll taxes (T ￿), and government transfers minus personal
taxes as (GTR ￿ T).
4.2 Estimation Methods
The New Keynesian model consists of equations that are non-linear in para-
meters. Following Hansen (1982) a model with rational expectations suggests
some natural orthogonality restrictions that can be used in the generalized
methods of moments (GMM) framework. We estimate (10), (11) using GMM.
Each equation estimated using GMM is of the form:
16The estimation was carried out using RATS, version 5.
17Which is standard practice in this literature (see Smets and Wouters, 2002, Leith and
Malley, 2002).
18We experimented with both a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter and regression on a polynomial
(cubic) trend for the real variables, and using CBO and OECD data on potential output.
The results reported here use a HP trend (￿ = 1600).
10yit = fi(￿i;zit) + uit (12)
where for each equation i, yit is the vector of dependent variables, ￿i is
the (ai ￿ 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and zit is the
(ki ￿ 1) vector of explanatory variables. The GMM approach is based on
the fact that e ￿i; the true value of ￿i, has the property E[hi( e ￿i;wit)] = 0,
where wit ￿ ( y0
it;z0
it;x0
it), and xit is an (ri ￿ 1) vector of instruments that
are correlated with zit. GMM then chooses the estimate ￿i so as to make the
sample moment as close as possible to the population moment of zero. In
our estimates we use four lags of the dependent variable and the exogenous
variables as instruments. The validity of these instruments can be tested for
each equation i using Hansen￿ s J-test, which is distributed as a ￿2(ri ￿ ai)
statistic under the null of valid orthogonality conditions.
GMM or IV estimation has been used by a number of authors to estimate
NK models19. One problem is that the estimated IS and NKPC equations are
highly nonlinear in parameters, and the rank condition for identi￿cation is
not met unless a number of parameters in these two equations are ￿xed. We
follow Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001) and Leith and Malley (2002) in
imposing restrictions on some of the parameters. We ￿x ￿ = 4, implying a
price-mark-up20 of 30%, 1￿￿ = 0:6 and that21 the habit formation parameter
on aggregate consumption is unity (￿ = 1). In the NKPC equation, we
















+ T ￿) = 0:095. Moreover, in the IS equation
we impose that the following steady-state values are given by their average














19For instance, Gal￿, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), Leith and Malley (2002), Kara
and Nelson (2002), Muscatelli et al. (2003).
20This follows Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). It is a lower value of the elasticity
of substitution than that used by Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001) and Leith and
Malley (2002), but in practice the estimates of the other parameters did not seem to
be very sensitive to changes in the value of ￿: However, a higher mark-up does seem to
be more sensible given that marginal costs exclude capital costs in this framework. In
addition, a higher value of ￿ would imply an implausibly small direct e⁄ect of output on
prices through the marginal cost term.
21In our earlier study, Muscatelli et al. (2003), where we estimate ￿ freely in a simpler










































suggested by the theory in the IS
equation (see the derivation in the Appendix).
However, it is worth noting that even with these restrictions, because of
the absence of any cross-equation restrictions23, the structural parameters
estimates are poorly de￿ned, in the sense that the standard errors of the es-
timated parameters are high, and GMM criterion function is very ￿ at across
wide ranges of the parameter space which makes it di¢ cult for the estima-
tion procedure to converge. Therefore, as we note below, we had to impose
additional restrictions and to use a grid-search procedure in order to obtain
parameter estimates that were statistically well-de￿ned.
4.3 Model Estimates
Table 1 reports the estimated New Keynesian model using GMM over the full
sample period. In estimating the NK output equation, we use the ex ante real
interest rate (b rt = b it ￿ Etb ￿t+1), where b it is the federal funds rate. As noted
above, we found that the parameter estimates were imprecise, even after
imposing the restriction suggested by theory that (￿;￿;￿;NRT=N) should all
be less than unity. To ensure convergence in the GMM estimation procedure,
we had to adopt a two-stage estimation procedure ￿xing the values of two of
the parameters, ￿ and ￿.
For the NKPC equation we conducted a grid search on ￿ so as to minimise
the standard error of the estimate, and ￿xed the discount factor ￿ at 0.99,
a value consistent with that used by Smets and Wouters (2002), but larger
than that estimated by Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001), Leith and
Malley (2002) and Muscatelli et al. (2003).
For the output equation, we estimated the model in two stages. Note from
(10) that if one estimates this equation without imposing any restrictions
on the parameters, by dividing the coe¢ cient on b yt￿1 by the coe¢ cient on








, where ￿ is been ￿xed at unity.
Note also that by dividing the estimated coe¢ cient on b rt by the estimated
23Unlike Leith and Malley (2002) the discount factor ￿ does not enter our IS equation
as our habit formation is based on external habits (￿ keeping up with the Joneses￿ ). See
also Carroll (2000) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999).










, where again recall
that C
Y is ￿xed at its sample average value. This allows us to obtain a point





, which are 3.18 and 0.839 respectively. We can
also compute asymptotic standard errors for these two parameters. We re-





from the ￿rst stage of
the estimation to ￿nd estimates for NRT
N and #. This improved the precision
of the estimates for the latter parameters.
The overall ￿t for the two equations is good. The R2 statistic for (10)
is 0.92 and for (11) is 0.98. The Hansen test for the two equations are
respectively 39.2 and 35.4, which are distributed as a ￿2(27) statistic under
the null of valid instruments. The null hypothesis of valid instruments is not
rejected at the 5% signi￿cance level.
Our point estimates are plausible, suggesting that 37% of consumers are
rule-of-thumb consumers, whilst 84% of total consumption in steady state is
given by optimising consumers. Rule-of-thumb consumers account for 59% of
total employment. Our estimates of the Calvo parameter suggest that 57%
adjust their prices every period, which is a slightly higher proportion than
that estimated by Gal￿ et al. (2001) and Muscatelli et al. (2003). Of these,
about half simply index prices.
The estimate of 37% of non-optimising consumers is actually quite close to
the ￿gures cited in Mankiw (2000) for rule-of-thumb behaviour of this type.
Citing the survey by Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) of consumers, which showed
that 43% intended to respond to the temporary tax cuts by George Bush Sr.
by increasing consumption, Mankiw (2000) notes that the lowest 40% of the
US income distribution earn about 15% of total income, whilst holding only
0.2% of household wealth. A ￿gure of 37% is therefore entirely consistent with
what we know from other micro-economic studies of US consumer behaviour.




























4.4 Dynamic and Stochastic Simulations
Having estimated our structural model, we now perform a number of dy-
namic simulation experiments to investigate the properties of this simple NK
model24, and the transmission of ￿scal and monetary policies. To simulate
the model, we close it by adding a Taylor rule for the federal funds rate. In
order to provide a baseline for an analysis of inertial rules below, we assume
a very simple type of forward-looking non-inertial Taylor rule:
b it = 1:5(Etb ￿t+1) + 0:5(b yt) (13)
Excluding inertia from this Taylor rule has the advantage of allowing
us to focus on the simulation properties of the structural model. As we
shall see below (Section 5.1.1), an inertial monetary policy rule implies a
considerable period of monetary expansion following an in￿ ation increase.
Excluding inertia allows us to focus on the structural properties of the ￿scal
24The model is solved using Winsolve version 3.0 (see Pierse, 2000), which provides
numerical solutions for linear and non-linear rational expectations models. We solve our
model using the Stacked Newton method in Winsolve. In solving the models with struc-
tural shocks (and further below with policy shocks) these are treated as unanticipated by
economic agents in the period the shock occurs.
14channels in the model rather than on its performance when monetary policy
is very inertial.
We ￿rst examine the impulse responses of the model. We add a structural
shock to each of the equations (10,11,13), and these and each of the exogenous
policy variables (b gt; b t￿;b t) are shocked in turn. We focus on the dynamic
model solution, under rational expectations. This allows us to examine the
properties of the model, and the response of output and in￿ ation to policy
and structural shocks. Essentially this involves simulating the model without
any reference to historical data. We do not examine the response to shocks
in government transfers, as they enter the IS equation in an identical way to
personal taxes. The variables treated as independent in the estimated model
as follows. Government transfers are simply assumed to be constant. On the
other hand we do wish to endogenize the real wage ( d w ￿ pt) and employment
(b nt). In our simulations, we assume limited wage stickiness by postulating
that nominal wages are indexed to in￿ ation with a one-period lag25, whilst
employment is obtained from a log-linearization of the short-run production
technology (5).
The results of the dynamic model solution are shown in Figures 1-5. These
display the responses of output, in￿ ation and the real interest rate, following
a temporary 1% shock to, respectively, the IS, NKPC and Taylor rule, and
to government spending and taxation. In the case of taxation we assume
that there is a proportionate shock to both payroll (b t￿) and personal taxes
(b t). The initial shock is 1% and this then recedes with a 0.5 autoregressive
parameter. Note that the government spending shock produces a positive
impact on output (see Gal￿ et al., 2002). As we shall see below, this result is
not altered by the introduction of feedback rules for ￿scal policy.
In Figure 4 we also plot the path of consumption. Note from this that by
estimating a NK model with rule-of-thumb consumers we obtain estimated
parameters which support Gal￿ et al.￿ s (2002) conjecture that non-optimising
consumers can explain the positive correlation between government spending
shocks and output. Turning to taxation (Figure 5), as expected a temporary
taxation shock tends to reduce output through its impact on IS, and increases
in￿ ation through the taxation wedge. As an illustration of the impact of
rule-of-thumb consumers, in the limit as # falls to zero, the output increase
25The introduction of an estimated wage equation would increase the complexity of the
model considerably and is beyond the scope of the current paper. The assumption of
an indexation-type model for wages is likely to be a reasonable approximation for wage



















Figure 1: Output Shock
following an output shock is about 25% smaller, and the system converges















Figure 2: In￿ ation Shock



















































Figure 5: Taxation Shock
5 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions and
Policy Design
5.1 Monetary and Fiscal Rules
Having examined the dynamic properties of our estimated model, we now
turn to the issue of policy design. The key question we address is whether, if
government spending and taxation operate according to automatic stabiliz-
ers, they actually assist or impede the e⁄orts of an independent central bank
which adopts a forward-looking in￿ ation targeting rule. More precisely, how
should automatic stabilizers be designed in order to ensure that monetary
and ￿scal policy act in concert?
In an earlier paper, Muscatelli et al. (2003), we presented evidence that
estimated ￿scal policy rules for the US appeared to be welfare-reducing, which
seemed to accord with the evidence (using di⁄erent modeling approaches) in
Gordon and Leeper (2003) and Jones (2002). From the point of view of a
central bank adopting an optimal policy rule designed to minimize a stan-
19dard quadratic loss function in deviations of output, in￿ ation and changes in
the policy instrument (the interest rate). We are now able to re-examine the
issue in a model where ￿scal policy may play a more important role because
rule-of-thumb consumers only indirectly react to the interest rate rule26. Fur-
thermore, the current model considers some additional additional channels
of transmission of ￿scal policy: taxation e⁄ects on consumption through liq-
uidity constrained consumers, and taxation wedge e⁄ects on in￿ ation, as well
as interaction e⁄ects due to the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers. In ad-
dition, instead of focusing on estimated ￿scal rules27, we will consider a more
systematic analysis of di⁄erent rules for ￿scal stabilizers.
5.1.1 Monetary Rule
Before turning to the issue of how one might design robust ￿scal rules, let us
turn ￿rst to monetary policy. Unlike ￿scal policy rules, we have a better idea
of how monetary policy has behaved in recent times, especially in the case
of the US, where the institutional framework has not changed markedly for
the Fed. There have been a number of attempts to estimate forward-looking
interest rate rules for the US, following the seminal work of Clarida et al.
(1998). Although there might be some concern that monetary policy rules
have shown some instability over time28, Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1998,
2000) highlight only one particular shift in the Fed￿ s monetary policy rule
around the early 1980s, during the Volcker chairmanship of the Fed.
In order to simulate monetary-￿scal policy interactions, we estimate a
forward-looking monetary policy rule for the sample period 1982(1)-2001(2).
This estimated monetary policy rule provides us with a benchmark against
which to assess the performance of di⁄erent designs for automatic ￿scal sta-
bilizers in our structural model.
Our estimated monetary rule for the nominal interest rate b it follows a
26As shown in Gal￿ et al. (2002), R-O-T consumers are a⁄ected by interest rate changes
only to the extent that the real wage adjusts following the new labour conditions deter-
mined by the optimising consumers￿reaction to such interest rate changes
27There is considerable evidence that estimated ￿scal rules are not very stable because
of the existence of di⁄erent ￿scal regimes. Favero and Monacelli (2003) identify a number
of Ricardian and non-Ricardian ￿scal regimes for the USA.
28Muscatelli et al. (2002) provide some evidence that shifts may have occurred even
after the Volcker years. One other caveat is that estimated monetary policy rules tend
to misinterpret important discretionary policy shifts as unanticipated deviations from the
policy rule.
20form similar to the standard forward-looking Taylor rule speci￿cation which
has become commonplace in the literature29 (see Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler,
1998, 2000; Muscatelli et al. 2002; Giannoni and Woodford, 2002a,b),
b it = ￿1Etb ￿t+q + ￿2b yt+s + ￿3b it￿1 (14)
where the rule also allows for interest-rate smoothing (inertia) if ￿3 6= 0.
In general we ￿nd that the best ￿t for this model is found for the speci￿c
case where q = 1;s = 030.
29The main di⁄erence is that we use a contemporaneous value of the output gap (see
Muscatelli et al. 2002) as opposed to expected future values, as in Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1998, 2000). For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Giannoni and Woodford
(2002a,b). For an alternative approach to modeling interest rate responses, involving
nonlinearities in reaction functions, see Cukierman and Muscatelli (2001).
30See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) for a justi￿cation of why a short in￿ ation-forecast
horizon might be optimal in cases where the degree of ￿ rule of thumb￿indexation (￿) or
in￿ ation inertia is high.
21Table 2: Estimated Monetary Policy Rule







The estimated parameters for (14) are reported in Table 2. The Hansen
test statistic is 24.73, which is insigni￿cant at the 5% level. The estimated
equation shows a signi￿cant output gap e⁄ect on interest rates, and a long-
run e⁄ect of expected in￿ ation on nominal interest rates which is given by
￿4 = (￿1=(1￿￿3)), and which is signi￿cantly greater than unity (￿4 = 1:817
with an asymptotic standard error equal to 0.095 ).
5.1.2 Fiscal Rules
We consider a simple backward-looking format for our ￿scal policy rules
(automatic stabilizers), following inter alia Van Den Noord (2000), Westaway
(2003) and Andres and Domenech (2003). This captures the more realistic
lagged response of ￿scal policy to macroeconomic variables due to automatic
stabilizers:
b gt = ￿1b gt￿1 ￿ ￿2b yt￿1 (15)
b ￿t = ’1b ￿t￿1 + ’2b yt￿1 (16)
where b ￿t is the vector of our two tax measures, personal taxes b tt and
payroll taxes, b t￿
t. Our taxation rule therefore imposes the same adjustment
pattern on both taxes, and does not look at how a mix of tax measures might
improve the design of policy31. The importance of the taxation policy mix
is considered further below. Note that we do not allow for any feedback
of policy to budget de￿cits or debt accumulation32. Recall that our models
31Andres and Domenech (2003) provide an analysis of how di⁄erent tax measures might
impact on output and in￿ ation variability.
32See for instance Bohn (1988) and Taylor (2000a,b). The lack of a debt or de￿cit
stabilization term raises the issue of whether our ￿scal rules imply a sustainable path
for government debt. The simulated paths of the debt to income ratio for the model
simulations discussed here are not reported for reasons of space, but are available from
the authors on request. They show some long-run variation in the debt-to-income ratio,
as would be expected in the absence of a feedback term on debt in the ￿scal rules, but the
e⁄ect is limited and the debt dynamics are stable.
22are estimated using detrended data and focus on stabilization over the cycle
rather than the shifts in ￿scal regimes which often accompany the correction
of de￿cits, or debt-correction strategies. Our ￿scal rules are largely capturing
automatic stabilizers through the autoregressive and the output gap terms.
For our baseline case, we set ￿1 = ’1 = 0:6; ￿2 = ’2 = 0:5. A coe¢ cient
of 0.5 on output is consistent with the empirical evidence in Van Den Noord
(2000) and adopted in studies on ￿scal stabilization (e.g. Westaway, 2003),
and are broadly consistent with the correlations for US ￿scal data over the
cycle (cf. Gordon and Leeper, 2003). We allow for an element of inertia
as empirical estimates of ￿scal policy rules suggest an important role for
an autoregressive term.We then consider a number of variants for the ￿scal
rules, and we also conduct some sensitivity analysis, to see to what extent the
performance of these ￿scal rules is a⁄ected by small changes in the estimated
model parameters.
5.2 Government spending rules versus Taxation Rules
We now perform some dynamic simulation with our model, closing it by
adding the estimated monetary policy rule and the taxation and government
spending rules in (16) and (15). Rather than assuming a particular form
of welfare loss function, in what follows we consider how the introduction
of a ￿scal policy rule impacts on output and in￿ ation variability (variance
frontiers) when it is combined with a monetary policy rule such as (14). Con-
ducting welfare analysis with a NK model such as ours is complex, because
of the presence of heterogeneous consumers (optimisers and rule-of-thumb
consumers)33, but computing variance frontiers allows a certain ranking of
policy rules, where it is apparent that one rule dominates the other in terms
of reducing both output and in￿ ation variability.
To construct the variance frontiers we apply a monetary policy rule where
the parameters ￿2 and ￿3 have the same values as those estimated and re-
ported in Table 2, but where we allow ￿1 to vary34. We then compute the
33See for instance Benigno and Woodford (2003). We are currently considering the
extension of our modeling framework to include some welfare analysis.
34The variance frontiers are plotted for values of ￿1 which vary between between 0.2
and 1.5. The reason for focusing on higher values of ￿1 compared to the estimated value
is that it is often argued that estimated monetary policy rules tend to underestimate the
response of the central bank to shifts in expected in￿ ation (and conversely overestimate























Figure 6: Variance Frontiers and Monetary-Fiscal Interactions
standard deviation of output and in￿ ation in dynamic simulations following
a shock to the Phillips Curve, and report these ￿ variance frontiers￿in the ￿g-
ures which follow. The results shown below do not seem to be too sensitive to
small changes in the values of the model parameters, in the sense of reversing
the rank of the various policy rules, and we shall return to this point below.
Figure 6 shows the variance frontiers when the model is simulated following
a temporary 1% in￿ ation shock, combining the forward-looking monetary
policy rule with the ￿scal policy rules in four scenarios:
(i) where ￿scal policy is kept exogenously ￿xed, i.e. the automatic stabi-
lizers (15) (16) are kept switched o⁄ (labelled ￿ none￿ )
(ii) where only the government spending rule is switched on
(iii) where only the taxation feedback rule is switched on
(iv) where both rules are switched on (labelled ￿ both￿ )
The interaction of ￿scal and monetary policy in the model works basi-
cally as follows: an shock to the Phillips Curve will cause in￿ ation to rise
stance.
24and output to fall. Real interest rates to fall temporarily as the monetary
policy rule is inertial. The automatic stabilisers in the model cause gov-
ernment spending to rise and taxation (payroll and personal taxes) to fall.
Once monetary policy begins to react, it will therefore tend to work against
government spending and personal taxation by reducing the consumption of
optimising consumers. Whilst government spending and personal taxes tend
to increase demand and raise output and in￿ ation, payroll taxes have the
bene￿cial e⁄ect of working in tandem with monetary policy by lowering the
tax wedge and raising the consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers35.
There are three points to note about the variance frontiers. The ￿rst
is that, in contrast with Muscatelli et al. (2003), automatic stabilizers are
no longer welfare-reducing. In particular, countercyclical taxation policy
seems able to reduce the variance of both output and in￿ ation. The second
point to note is that government spending does not have an unambiguous
welfare-enhancing e⁄ect: introducing a feedback rule for government spend-
ing tends to shift the variance frontier very slightly north-westwards, lowering
the variability of output, but at the expense of more variable in￿ ation. This
might explain our earlier results on the welfare-reducing properties of ￿scal
policies. Third, introducing both automatic stabilizers is still preferable to
having none, even though the variance frontier shifts north-westwards, sug-
gesting that taxation has a much greater impact on the variance frontier than
government spending.
The explanation for this result lies in the di⁄erent way in which govern-
ment spending and taxation operates in the model: government spending
varies the pro￿le of output but its impact is ultimately reversed, as the dis-
tributed lag e⁄ect sums to zero. In contrast, taxation has an impact through
both the wedge (a level e⁄ect) and through the IS curve (in di⁄erence terms),
and this is not reversed because of its impact on external habits.
To con￿rm the relative importance of personal taxes relative to payroll
taxes in stabilizing output and in￿ ation, we repeated the above experiment
using only personal taxes and then using only payroll taxes. In general we
found that most of the stabilization e⁄ect comes from payroll taxes through
their impact on the wedge, especially for cases where ￿1 is high. The intuition
for this is straightforward, and can be gleaned from the impulse responses
in Figures 4 and 5: following an adverse shock to the Phillips curve, out-
35The impulse responses of the policy variables following the Phillips Curve shock are
not presented here for reasons of space, but are available on request.
25put falls and as payroll taxes fall, they stabilise both in￿ ation (through the
wedge e⁄ect) and output (through the disposable income of rule-of-thumb
consumers). In contrast personal taxes act only through the IS curve and
hence stabilise output at the expense of in￿ ation stability. Only where ￿1
is low, so that the monetary authority reacts less forcefully to the in￿ ation
shock, do personal taxes help to stabilise output and in￿ ation. In other
words, payroll taxes are generally more complementary to monetary policy
in this model.
5.3 Inertial Fiscal Rules
We now turn to the issue of how such automatic stabilizers should be de-
signed. Would it be best for ￿scal policy rules such as (15) and (16) to be
persistent? The literature on the design of monetary policy rules (see Gi-
annoni and Woodford, 2002a,b) shows that inertial monetary policy rules
can, in some circumstances be very bene￿cial. However, in our earlier paper
(Muscatelli et al., 2003), our conjecture was that a lack of co-ordination be-
tween the two policies, especially when both are highly inertial, might cause
a reduction in welfare.
In Figure 7 we show the e⁄ect on the variance frontier of changing the
parameter ￿1 to 0.9 (high persistence) and to 0.1 (low persistence), whilst
keeping the taxation rule unchanged. In Figure 8, we similarly plot the
variance frontiers when we vary ’1 to 0.9 (high persistence) and 0.1 (low
persistence).
Figure 7 in part con￿rms the conjecture in Muscatelli et al. (2003) about
how inertia in government spending, when combined with a highly iner-
tial monetary policy rule might be welfare-reducing. Although the variance
frontier does not shift markedly, it is almost entirely encompassed by the
standard case where ￿1 = ’1 = 0:6 (labelled ￿ both￿ ). Conversely, lowering
the persistence of government spending produces a variance frontier which
roughly overlaps that of the benchmark case.
Figure 8, however, shows that for taxation a high-persistence policy re-
duces both output and in￿ ation variability and is closer to being optimal,
given this particular monetary policy rule. By contrast a more countercycli-
cal and less inertial taxation rule tends to raise the variability of both output
and in￿ ation. The intuition behind this result lies in the way in which (per-
sonal and payroll) taxation enters the IS curve, in di⁄erence form. A highly
















































Figure 8: Inertia and Taxation Rule
27ticularly e¢ cient in the case where the output gap depends on the change
in taxation. By decomposing the e⁄ect of payroll and personal taxes one
can again show, as discussed above, that payroll taxes are a more e⁄ective
complement to monetary policy.
5.4 The Impact of Rule-of-Thumb Consumers
How robust are our conclusions on the e¢ ciency of automatic stabilizers
to changes in the number of rule-of-rhumb consumers? Gal￿ et al. (2002)
￿nd that increasing the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers in a New
Keynesian model with sticky prices can increase instability in the model and
potentially lead to indeterminacy.
In what follows we show the impact of raising the proportion of employ-
ment made up by rule-of-thumb consumers (NRT=N) to 0.7 (the ￿ More ROT
Consumers￿case), and consequently lowering the proportion of consumption
determined by optimising consumers (Co=C) to 0.571, or lowering the num-
ber of rule-of-rhumb consumers (the ￿ Less ROT Consumers￿case), given by
a value of (NRT=N) equal to 0.275 and a value of (Co=C) equal to 0.88.
We again simulate the model following an in￿ ation shock, and as shown
in Figure 9, we see that a lower proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers tends
to stabilise the model. It is important to note that there are two e⁄ects at
play here. First, decreasing the number of rule-of-thumb consumers makes
payroll taxes less e⁄ective (see parameter a2 in 10) as payroll taxes impact on
labour income and hence on the consumption of rule-of-thumbers. Second, it
improves the degree of consumption smoothing, and raises the e⁄ectiveness





. Clearly this second e⁄ect dominates, and causes the variance
function to shift towards the origin, albeit by increasing the variability of
in￿ ation.
5.5 The Size of the Tax Wedge
As another robustness check, we will examine whether increasing or decreas-
ing the size of the tax wedge in the Phillips Curve tends to improve stabili-
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Figure 10: The Tax Wedge and Automatic Stabilizers
intuitively obvious, increasing the size of the tax wedge tends to improve the
e⁄ectiveness of countercyclical taxation policy and hence shifts the variance
frontier towards the origin. This again con￿rms the greater role of payroll
taxes in ￿scal stabilisation in this model. Clearly however, there is a down-
side to this, as a larger tax wedge will also increase the destabilizing impact
of any ￿scal policy deviation from the rule.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a ￿rst attempt to model monetary-￿scal interactions in
an estimated New Keynesian DGE model, in which we allowe for a wide range
of ￿scal policy channels. Our simulation provide some initial insights on the
way in which di⁄erent macroeconomic policy instruments interact over the
business cycle.
The key conclusion which emerges from our policy analysis is the follow-
ing: automatic stabilizers based on taxation policy seem to combine more
e¢ ciently with forward-looking inertial monetary policy rules than feedback
30government spending rules. This seems to be largely due to the way in which
taxation (both personal and payroll taxes) enter the model, through the role
played by rule-of-thumb consumers, whose consumption depends on current
disposable income, but whose behaviour impacts on optimising consumers
because of the presence of external habits. This causes the taxation e⁄ects
to enter in di⁄erence terms in the IS curve. Interestingly, it also follows that
inertia in ￿scal rules may be more bene￿cial in taxation rules than in gov-
ernment spending rules, and in particular that payroll taxes, which act both
through the tax wedge in the Phillips curve and through the diposable income
of rule-of-thumb consumers, are the most e⁄ective ￿scal stabilisation instru-
ment. This result will be examined more systematically in further work, to
examine to what extent the result is robust to changes in the speci￿cation
of the model. In particular, if one were to modify the way in which non-
Ricardian consumers are modeled this will change the way in which taxation
a⁄ects the output gap. For instance, by introducing liquidity-constrained
forward-looking consumers one would introduce taxation e⁄ects in levels in
the IS curve and this might attenuate some of the bene￿ts of inertial taxation
rules. Clearly introducing some form of liquidity constraint or Blanchard-
Yaari consumers would also introduce a role for wealth, and hence another
channel of monetary-￿scal interaction, through the budget identity. Simi-
larly, introducing greater persistence in external habits might also change
the impact over time of taxation on aggregate demand and might change the
relative e⁄ectiveness of taxation and government spending. Another area
which should be extended is the extent to which monetary policy design
might be a⁄ected by the design of the ￿scal rules. Finally, we are extending
the model to the open economy case which will allow us to model ￿scal policy
interactions in a monetary union.
The paper also demonstrates that there is empirical support for the con-
jecture in Gal￿ et al. (2002) that rule-of-thumb behaviour can adequately
explain the consumption inertia, and particularly the observed co-movement
of consumption and government spending following a ￿scal shock.
In this paper we have simply taken the monetary policy rule as that
estimated for the USA using post-1982 data, but arguably the monetary
authority will modify its behaviour in the light of changes in ￿scal policy.
So one could legitimately ask the question of how di⁄erent ￿scal rules will
perform in the presence of optimising monetary policymakers. The di¢ culty
of this extension is that the complexity of the framework makes it di¢ cult
to derive an appropriate welfare function for the monetary authorities, so
31one would need to make some assumptions regarding the form of the welfare
function of the central bank (cf. Benigno and Woodford, 2003).
A full analysis of how optimal ￿scal rules could be designed for a vari-
ety of di⁄erent monetary policy rules, and how inertia in monetary policy
impacts on the optimal design of ￿scal stabilizers in a model of strategic in-
teraction is potentially important, and would be an interesting extension of
this paper. This is particularly important in the case of Euroland, where the
debate on the optimal degree of ￿scal activism and the limits which should
be imposed on ￿scal policy is still very open. In the UK, the discussion
about the appropriate degree of ￿scal activism has also been prominent in
the recent Treasury Assessment on the impact on the UK of joining EMU
(see Westaway, 2003), and merits further attention.
7 Appendix: derivation of IS and Phillips
curve
We begin with the de￿nition of total demand and total consumption:







t de￿nes the amount of consumption by rule-of-thumb consumers
and CO
t de￿nes the amount of consumption by optimizing consumers. This
is akin to Gal￿ at al. (2002).














where # de￿nes the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers. (we assume
that GTR
t ￿ Tt is uniformly spread across consumers).
We ￿rst turn to the behavior of optimizing consumers.
From equations (1), (2), (3), assuming that all consumers￿preferences
and their initial holdings of ￿nancial wealth are identical, the problem can
32be solved as a dynamic optimization problem and we can aggregate across



















Taking logs we obtain a ￿rst order approximation, where we also omit






















t are the logs of total consumption.
Then, using the equilibrium condition for goods markets, given that we
ignore investment and the external sector, we can loglinearise equation (17)
in the main text






































































Substituting for c cO







































































































To complete the model we want to introduce distortionary taxes. We





the total revenues from the payroll tax. Essentially the payroll tax is divided
equally between the labour force. This means that the optimizing consumer￿ s




























PR = b t￿ ￿ b n
Then bearing in mind that
ln(MPL) = ln(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ln(N)























d w ￿ p
￿
we can then substitute for
￿
d w ￿ p
￿
into(27) to obtain equation (10).
The derivation of the Phillips Curve for the model structure set out in the
main text is outlined in detailed in Gal￿ et al. (2001) and Leith and Malley
(2002), and will not be reproduced here for reasons of space. The introduction
of the payroll tax, however, changes the de￿nition of the percentage change
from steady state of the labour cost share, b st. Substituting for
￿
















b t￿ ￿ b n
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b t￿ ￿ b n
￿
+ b nt ￿ b yt. This yields our modi￿ed
version of the Phillips Curve including the tax wedge (11).
8 Data Appendix
8.1 Data de￿nitions
The data employed are quarterly observations, seasonally adjusted where
available. The variables are expressed in deviations from the steady state,
so real-sector variables are detrended, whilst the series on in￿ ation and the
35nominal interest rate (the federal funds rate) are demeaned, using the respec-
tive sample average. For detrending, we experimented with both a Hodrick-
Prescott ￿lter and regression on a polynomial (cubic) trend for the real vari-
ables, and using Congressional Budget O¢ ce￿ s and OECD (Economic Out-
look) data for potential output and the output gap, respectively. The results
reported use a HP trend (￿ = 1600). All variables except interest rates are
expressed in logs.
The government spending data (G) is federal government spending ex-
cluding transfers and net interest payments, whilst we use employers￿social
security contributions as a proxy for payroll taxes (T ￿), and government
transfers minus personal taxes as (GTR ￿T). The wage series is the index of
average weekly earnings.
The output gap is de￿ned as the (log) di⁄erence between actual and
potential output. In￿ ation is the 4-quarter (log) di⁄erence in the Consumer
Price Index. The monetary policy instrument is the Federal Funds Rate.
Real series were obtained by dividing nominal series by the GDP implicit
price de￿ ator.
8.2 Time-series￿sources
The data on actual and potential output, the implicit price de￿ ator, fed-
eral government spending, federal (total) government debt, tax revenues,
social security contributions, federal government transfers and net interest
payments are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis￿NIPA Tables. (See
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn1.htm). Civilian employment, weekly earn-
ings and weekly hours of work are all seasonally adjusted series from the
OECD Main Economic Indicators.
In￿ ation is the 4-quarter (log) di⁄erence in the Consumer Price Index,
derived from OECD Main Economic Indicators￿CPI, all items, seasonally
adjusted series. The call money rate is the Federal Funds￿rate, obtained
from IMF￿ s IFS. The IMF Commodity Price Index was used to compute the
rate of change of commodity prices.
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